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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to study how Behavioural Finance affects Portfolio 
Management decisions and performance by studying a real case - the Nova Students Portfolio 
(NSP) course. To do so, this paper explored the main topics in the Behavioural Finance theory 
as well as the most common behavioural biases and applied the theory to the NSP fund. There 
was found evidence in the NSP of 10 well known biases in literature as well as some of their 
consequences. Recommendations were then proposed in order to avoid them. Furthermore, 
the investor sentiment was studied but it was found no evidence of weekly predictive power 
of investor sentiment on the short-term asset prices. 
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1. Introduction 
“The investor’s chief problem – even his worst enemy – is likely to be himself.” 
Benjamin Graham 
The purpose of this Work Project is to understand how the human nature of investor’s 
behaviour affects his decision-making process and impacts his performance. The analysis of 
the Nova Students Portfolio (NSP) will constitute a practical example to understand how the 
field of Behavioural Finance influences the decisions taken and the fund’s performance. The 
aim of the paper is then to introduce this emerging area of Finance as well as to apply it to a 
real case, while taking conclusions that can be useful and applicable in the following years of 
the course as well as to other funds. Standard finance models assume investors as being 
rational but the human condition makes humans susceptible to some cognitive biases while 
making decisions. Indeed, Warren Buffet states that: “The fact that people will be full of 
greed, fear or folly is predictable. The sequence is not predictable.” This paper plans to ‘give 
some predictability’ to this behaviours by trying to find these biases in practice, show their 
possible consequences and provide recommendations for investors to be less affected by them 
while investing. 
The structure of this Work Project will be as follows: Section 2 will describe the NSP 
fund and its performance. Section 3 will function as a literature review by providing some 
relevant theory of Behavioural Finance, including how it appeared, what developments has it 
experienced and what are its main principles and as well as the well known biases affecting 
investors. Section 4 will analyse the data from the fund to find some of the biases described in 
the previous section and their consequences but also present some recommendations to avoid 
these biases. Finally, section 5 will analyse the market sentiment to understand its predictive 
power and its impact on the NSP decisions.  
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2. Nova Students Portfolio (NSP) 
 2.1. NSP description  
The Nova Students Portfolio is a long only portfolio managed by a group of around 15 
students from the Masters in Finance of Nova School of Business and Economics, under the 
supervision of two professors. It was launched in November 2014 (this was its second year) 
with an inception net asset value (NAV) of $310,000, sponsored by a Portuguese bank. The 
portfolio invests in stocks and bonds in the US market and starts with a 60/40 allocation in 
bonds and equities, respectively, by investing in the following ETF’s: BOND US Equity1 and 
SPY US Equity. The students are supposed to change the allocation and have two options to 
do so: change the weights on a maximum of 10% up or down or change to risk parity, 
depending on whether they are more bullish or bearish on the market. Students should also 
present stock picks that may be added to the portfolio. The performance is evaluated against a 
fixed 60/40 benchmark composed by two indexes: LBUSTRUU Index2 (bonds) and SPX 
Index (equities). 
 2.2. NSP Performance and Statistics 
Firstly, some general performance measures of the whole NSP (2 years) will be 
presented but then this work project will only be focused on the last year’s fund. Considering 
the whole NSP performance, the fund underperformed the benchmark with an annualized 
return of 2.16% against 2.57% with info sharpes of 0.26 and 0.33, respectively (annualized 
volatilities of 8.43% and 7.73%, respectively). In value, the NSP ended up, at the end of May, 
with a NAV of $319,528 while the benchmark ended up with a theoretical $321,688. This is 
translated in an Information ratio of -0.17 that shows the underperformance of the NSP. 
(Table of overall general performance in appendix 1 and weights allocation in appendix 2).  
																																								 																					
1 BOND US Equity: PIMCO Total Active Return ETF is an actively managed ETF that invests in fixed income instruments. 
2 LBUSTRUU Index: Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index is an index that measures the investment grade bonds with a fixed-rate 
taxable bond market. 
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The graph below shows the evolution of the UP of the NSP against the one of the 
benchmark, since the inception of the fund. 
Graph 1. NSP UP vs Benchmark UP 
 
Considering the performance of this last year of the NSP course, after a period of 
investment of around 6 months (from mid November until the end of May), the portfolio 
registered a total return of 1.56% (2.90% annualized) against 2.35% for the benchmark 
(4.37% annualized). This was calculated based on the UPs on the first Investment Committee 
(IC) 101.57 and 101.44, respectively for the NSP and the benchmark, and the UPs on the last 
IC, 103.07 and 103.77, respectively. In terms of risk, the NSP portfolio had an annualized 
volatility of 7.29% against 6.57% of the benchmark and a beta of 0.39 against 0.36 of the 
benchmark, showing that NSP was more sensitive to changes in the market than the 
benchmark. Also, the NSP average total VaR was 0.78% of the NAV, being 0.80% from 
equities and 0.18% from bonds (VaR graph can be found in appendix 3). The lower return 
and higher risk of the NSP fund resulted in an Info Sharpe of 0.40 against 0.67 of the 
benchmark and in an Information ratio3 of -0.54. If one looks to each month performance, one 
concludes that the NSP underperformed the benchmark in all the months, except November 
(Table with monthly performance in appendix 4). 
The following table has a summary of the general performance against the benchmark 
for the last year’s fund performance with the descriptive statistics mentioned before.  
																																								 																					
3 Information ratio: Ratio of the portfolio returns in excess of the returns of the benchmark relative to the volatility of those returns. It 










































































































Table 1. General Performance of the NSP vs Benchmark (last year) 
  NSP Benchmark 
Total Return 1.57% 2.35% 
Annualized Return 2.92% 4.37% 
Annualized Volatility 7.28% 6.57% 
Info Sharpe 0.40 0.67 
Max Drawdown -3.84% -3.54% 
Beta 0.40 0.36 
Skew -0.43 -0.47 
Kurtosis 0.67 1.19 
Max Return 2.12% 2.04% 
Min Return -1.93% -1.79% 
NAV - Inception $ 314,853.03 $ 314,467.83 
NAV - Final $ 319,527.89 $ 321,687.57 
Information Ratio -0.54 
 
Throughout the 19 ICs, there were 50 stock picks presented, 36 approved and 14 
rejected what gives an approval rate of 72%. From the 36 approved, there were 33 different 
picks as 3 stocks were bought twice. Also, there were 16 stocks approved in the first half of 
the investment period (44%) and 20 approved in the second half (56%). 53% of the stocks 
obtained a positive absolute return while 47% had a negative absolute return. In terms of 
relative returns, half of the stocks outperformed the S&P 500 while the other half 
underperformed. The weighted average return of the stocks when compared to the S&P 500 
was -0.35%. In relative terms, the best stock pick was KORS US Equity with a return of 
31.55% and the worst was DAL US Equity with -18.82% (graph with stocks picks 
performance can be found in appendix 5). 
In terms of weekly P&L it is also important to understand the impact of each of the 
asset classes: equities (without stock picks), bonds and stock picks. The asset class with the 
best performance was bonds followed by the stock picks and finally by the equities. They 
presented an average contribution to the weekly P&L of respectively 0.07%, 0.04% and -
0.04% and a total cumulative return of 2.93%, 0.60% and -0.23%, respectively. The graph 
below presents the weekly P&L contribution of each asset class. 
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Graph 2. Weekly P&L contribution by asset class 
 
The allocation decisions are also very important for the fund’s performance and they are 
decided based on whether students are more bullish or bearish on the market performance for 
the following week. In retrospective, one can conclude when the decisions were good or bad 
in the 19 ICs as one has now the information of what happened after the decisions being 
made. From those 19 allocation decision, 37% were good decisions and 63% were bad, 
meaning that in only 37% of the time the students were able to “guess” were the market was 
going by analyzing several factors as for example the main events and news in the previous 
and next week, the market performance and the market sentiment. Despite this, the NSP fund 
was still able to beat the benchmark in 53% of the times. By analyzing the cumulative returns 
on different allocation decision paths, one has that the NSP performance was 1.91% against 
2.35% of the benchmark. This means that despite beating the benchmark most of the time, the 
cumulative performance was still lower. Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that if NSP 
students opted for maintaining always the same allocation, either 60/40 or 55/45, the 
performance would always be better than the one achieved and the fund would have beaten 
the benchmark as the cumulative returns would have been 2.46% and 2.41% respectively. If 
one take the case where the best decision was always taken (inside the range of 10% up or 











































































students ended up making the best decisions but just between 60/40 and 55/45 (60/40 when 
bearish and 55/45 when bullish), the cumulative return would have been 3.25%. This analysis 
has three main conclusions: the first is that if choosing always one allocation scheme, it is 
somehow indifferent on which one to choose as they end up with approximately the same 
results, in the period mentioned. The second is that if the decisions were bad most of the time 
(as happened), it would have been better to keep always the same allocation. Finally, on the 
other hand, if the allocation decisions were good most of the time, both the fixed allocation 
scheme and the benchmark would be beaten. The graph of the cumulative returns of the 
allocation decisions mentioned before can be found below.  
Graph 3. Comparison of the cumulative returns on different allocation decisions 
 
But how can one infer what would be the best decision for the next week? Market 
sentiment can be a good hint on that as investors’ expectations may have a huge impact on 
their trading behavior and consequently on the market performance. This is why this topic on 
market sentiment is important and will then be analyzed further on in this work project. 
In conclusion, the NSP fund underperformed the benchmark with a difference of -
1.47% annualized return. This underperformance can be explained by 3 main factors: i) 
underperformance of the bond ETF, ii) bad allocation decisions and iii) not very good stock 
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3. Behavioral Finance 
 3.1. Background and Evolution 
Are markets rational? Does the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) hold in practice? 
These questions are a good starting point to discuss Behavioral Finance Theory and how it 
appeared.  
Authors defending the EMH state that stock price fluctuations are independent of each 
other (Kendall, 1953), the market and stocks could be just as random as flipping a coin 
(Malkiel, 1999) and that stock prices approximately describe random walks through time and 
so, price changes are unpredictable (Shiller, 2000). Fama (1998) argues that irrational 
behavior is not sufficient for market inefficiency, as arbitrage by rational investors would 
push prices to their correct value. But this might not be true because, as Keynes said, 
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent” (Prast, 2004). The idea 
behind Behavioural Finance is then very simple and easy to understand: Humans are not 
always rational in the way equilibrium models assume us to be. (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000). 
This happens because human decisions are subject to cognitive illusions. This topic of market 
efficiency has been widely discussed throughout the time with Behavioural Finance trying to 
solve what neoclassical finance fails in explaining.  
Howard (2014) states that the capital market theory has passed mainly through two 
paradigms to explain the movements of market prices and is now experiencing the rise of a 
third one. It all started in the mid 30’s when Graham and Dodd (1929) tried to explain market 
movements just based on fundamental analysis. It lasted until mid 70’s when a second 
paradigm emerged, the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), introduced by Markowitz (1952) 
and followed by other authors as Sharpe (1964). This one, on the other hand, stated that 
markets were efficient as they could fully incorporate all the available information. Despite 
agreeing that investors made cognitive errors, they argued that there were also rational 
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investors arbitraging pricing inefficiencies. This standard finance model where rational 
investors would always make prices equal to the present value of it future cash flows was not 
able to explain some market anomalies [eg: stocks with low price-to-earnings (PE) ratios 
outperformed high PE stocks studied by Basu (1977)], crashes, bubbles and other phenomena 
(Howard, 2014)]. Warren Buffet even mentions the following about bubbles: “Like most 
trends, at the beginning it’s driven by fundamentals, at some point speculation takes over.” 
Due to these problems facing MPT, the study of how investors actually make decisions 
emerged, as this decision-making process under risk is in fact less simple than what was 
described in the assumptions of the standard finance theories. This was the genesis of the 
third paradigm that became known as Behavioral Finance.  
 3.2. Behavioural Finance Theory 
In the words of (Shefrin, 2009): “Behavioural finance, as a field, is the application of 
psychology to financial decision making and financial markets and, as a process, is about the 
transformation of the financial paradigm from a neoclassical based framework to a 
psychologically based framework”. Thaler (2005) describes Behavioural Finance even in a 
simpler way by saying: that “it is simply open-minded finance”. 
 In others words, it is a field of finance that tries to fill the existent gap in the efficient 
markets theory by studying psychological biases that cannot be captured in models based on 
perfect investor rationality and proposing psychological theories to explain market anomalies. 
It surged in the 80’s with contributors as the financial economists Robert Shiller, Hersh 
Shefrin, Werner De Bondt and Richard Thaler, and the psychologists Daniel Kahneman, and 
Amos Tversky, some of them cited in this paper (De Bondt et al., 2008). Literature in 
Behavioural Finance is then based on two main assumptions: firstly, investors are subject to 
sentiment, meaning that each investor has a certain belief about risk and future cash flows that 
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is not only derived by the existent facts and, secondly, there are limits to arbitrage, meaning 
that betting against sentimental investors is risky and costly. (Baker and Wurgler, 2007).  
Besides the two main assumptions just mentioned, this field of finance has two main 
pillars: the Prospect Theory and the irrational use of information. (Prast, 2004). The first pillar 
of Behavioural Finance is what became known has the Prospect Theory which was developed 
in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the paper: "Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision under Risk". Its main point is that the theory of expected utility maximization 
does not hold in practice. This theory is based on the already mentioned idea that people do 
not always behave rationally and that there are biases influencing people’s choices under 
conditions of uncertainty (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000). Actually, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) found in their studies that people most of the time did not chose the option that 
maximised their expected utility and, also, that people’s decision weights do not correspond 
to objective probabilities. The second pillar is focused on how people often process and use 
information in an irrational way. Information is not used in an objective manner by the 
investors, as human beings suffer from some biases and heuristics (Prast, 2004). Indeed, Jason 
Zweig (the editor of the revised edition of Benjamin Graham’s The Intelligent Investor and 
the writer of one of the first books exploring the neuroscience of investing) has a sentence 
that describes well the human behaviour biases and investing: “Investing isn’t about beating 
others at their game. It’s about controlling yourself at your own game”. 
 3.3. Biases and Heuristics 
After discussing the main topics on this recent field of Finance, one will now present 
some of the well-studied heuristics (mental shortcuts) and consequent biases in literature that 
will be used further on to explain the behaviour of NSP students and some of their decisions: 
Loss Aversion: As the name suggests, this bias is the tendency for people to be more 
frustrated with a given loss than happy with a gain of the same size. It is one of the biases 
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described in the Prospect Theory and states that an investor is more prone to risk when faced 
with the prospect of losses, but more risk-averse when faced with gains people prefer 
avoiding losses to making gains (Kannadhasan, 2006). Some studies state that investors 
consider the loss of $1 twice as painful as the pleasure got from a $1 gain (Singh, 2012).  
Cognitive Dissonance: "Cognitive Dissonance is the mental conflict that people 
experience when they are presented with evidence that their beliefs or assumptions are 
wrong." (Montier, 2002). It is the tendency for people to fell internal anxiety in the presence 
of two conflicting cognitive elements, namely, an opinion and new information. Normally, 
investors try to reduce this cognitive dissonance as they have difficulty to realize their initial 
opinion was wrong. At some point in time, as more information is released, people will 
realize that their initial decision was wrong and if one thinks in the aggregate market, it may 
lead to a sudden change of direction of the market (Prast, 2004). 
Disposition effect: Disposition effect refers to the tendency for people to realize small 
gains but avoid realizing small losses. The result is the closing of several positions with small 
gains and few with small losses. For example, few people would sell a stock for $18 that was 
bought at $20 but that has already dropped to $15. Most people do not want to sell it until it is 
above $20 again (Singh, 2012). 
Regret Aversion: Regret aversion arises from the fact that investors avoid feeling 
guilty for a poor decision and regret the pain of being responsible for it (Zeelenberg et al., 
1996). Hence, one of its consequences is that people will have the tendency to hold poor 
performing stocks. 
Mental Accounting: Mental accounting is the tendency that people has to separate 
financial decisions into different mental accounts despite the fact that would make more sense 
to consider them together in the same portfolio decision. When making two investment 
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decisions, investors tend to consider them separately in practice while portfolio theory states 
that it would be optimal to integrate them (Prast, 2004). 
Overconfidence: Overconfidence is the investor’s tendency to overestimate its ability. 
“Overconfidence can be summarized as unwarranted faith in one’s intuitive reasoning, 
judgments, and cognitive abilities” (Pompian, 2006). It is higher among investors than among 
people from other professions as in this particular case they can easily blame unforeseen 
circumstances for their mistakes (Nofsinger 2001). Two of the causes of overconfidence are 
the self-serving bias (tendency that people has to interpret and process information in a way 
more favourable to him/her) and the biased self-attribution (tendency that people have to 
attribute the success to its own ability and attribute failures to others).  
Availability: Availability is a cognitive heuristic in which a decision maker relies upon 
knowledge that is readily available (Sewell, 2007). People tend to overweight information 
that is easily accessible (De Bondt et al., 2008). For example, people will now be more 
cautious in investing in structured products, as the 2008 financial crisis is still present in their 
minds, despite the fact that the objective probability of this event happening has not changed. 
Then, this caution is not because of a objective high probability of a financial crisis but then 
due to a subjective increase of that probability. 
Anchoring: is the tendency for people to make estimates based on a reference value or 
an initial value and make adjustments to find the final answer (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Most of the times adjustments are insuficient (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971). People 
usually rely to much on an “anchor” when making decisions and then tend to change slowly 
when presented with new information. It is normally a logically irrelevant reference point that 
investors use while making an investment decision (Pompian, 2006). Anchoring can be then one 
of the causes of conservatism that can then lead to underreaction.  
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Gamblers Fallacy: Gamblers Fallacy is the tendency that people have to think that a 
tendency will revert despite the fact that the probabilities are the same (Singh, 2012). When 
flipping a coin, for example, after seven “heads”, people will be more willing to bet on “tails” 
despite the fact that the probability of each outcome is always 50%.  
Herding Behaviour: Herding behaviour is the tendency for people to follow the trend 
or to “go with the crowd” (Banerjee, 1992). Hence, investors trade more based on emotion 
and sentiment than in objective facts or fundamentals as investors are most of the time 
concerned of what others think of their investment decisions (Stein and Scharfstein, 1988). 
This behaviour is an example of extreme market sentiment as either in market bubbles or 
crashes, investors follow others in a rush to enter or exit the market (Caldwell and Dolvin, 
2012). 
In conclusion, there are some well-accepted facts among Behavioural Finance literature, 
but this is still an emerging field where no unified theory exists at this time (Kannadhasan, 
2006). Also, it has still some weaknesses mainly in modelling the patterns found empirically. 
From now on, it is essential to address this weakness to continue the process of 
“behaviouralizing finance” (Shefrin, 2009). In this way, Shefrin (2009) believes that the 
future of finance will somehow be a mix of standard finance and behavioural finance as a 
logic evolution would be to combine the more realistic assumptions of behavioural finance 
with the rigorous methodology and analysis used by neoclassical finance models. 
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4. Behavioural Finance impact’s on NSP decision making process and performance 
 4.1. Biases within the NSP 
After presenting and explaining the biases and heuristics studied in the Behavioural 
Finance literature, one can now go further on and try to find them within NSP students’ 
decisions and evaluate their impact in the NSP performance. 
The first three biases mentioned in section 3 were Loss Aversion, Cognitive Dissonance 
and Disposition Effect. They are very similar, and the first two can be seen as causes for the 
third. The loss aversion presented by investors will make them reluctant in closing positions 
with small losses while cognitive dissonance will make people to try to ignore information 
that goes against its belief or that suggests they made a wrong decision It has two immediate 
consequences: firstly, investors will be more reluctant in realizing losses, what can be 
translated in even higher losses and secondly, investors may be willing to take more risk to 
offset the losing position (e.g.: an “all or nothing” bet on a stock or increase the exposure to 
more risky assets). NSP data was analysed to find these patterns of no realization of small 
losses and “all or nothing bets” when losing. What was observed was that from the 7 negative 
positions closed by students, 6 were closed by the stop loss (most of the time around -10%) 
and only 1 was closed with a small loss (lower than 5%). Here is clearly present the pattern of 
loss aversion has students always expect the tendency to revert and their stocks to end up 
performing well. Furthermore, by taking the beta and volatility of all the stocks, one can infer 
that from the 12 stocks presented in the last 4 ICs, 4 of them were in the top 5 of the most 
risky stocks presented and 5 of them in the top 10 of the most risky stocks presented. This 
implicitly shows a high percentage of “nothing to lose” bets when reaching the end of the 
investment period. From the top 5 volatile stocks, just 1 of them had a positive return 
(curiously the most volatile one). Another analysis that can contribute to test these biases is 
the average holding period of the stocks. By looking at this, what is seen is that the average 
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holding period, taking into account all the 33 approved stocks, is 42 days. But if one 
computes the average of the 10 best performing stocks and the 10 worst performing stocks, 
the conclusion is that students on average hold losing stocks (47 days) much more time than 
winning stocks (37 days), what also confirms these biases. The results found are in 
accordance with Feng and Seasholes (2005) study where is mentioned that experience 
eliminates the reluctance to realize losses (Glaser and Weber 2007), but on the other hand, it 
contradicts a study on another students’ managed fund, where it was found that students were 
more likely to sell losing stocks and keep winning stocks than vice-versa (Kranner, 
Stoughton, and Zechner 2014). 
The fourth bias presented was Regret Aversion and it is also related with the previous 
three, as it can also be a cause for disposition effect. The wish to avoid this regret can affect 
new investment decisions with investors avoiding sectors or stocks that performed bad 
recently in an anticipation of the sentiment of guilt they would feel if they made the 
investment there and lost money. Furthermore, this regret aversion and consequent “run” 
from poor performing sectors/stocks can lead investors to invest more in hot or well 
established companies, encouraging the herd behaviour as they think that if they lose money, 
so will a lot of other people, and therefore they will not fell so bad about it (Singh 2012). To 
test this bias, the presence of momentum stocks in the portfolio as well as hot stocks was 
analysed. Hot stocks were measured based on the fact that they are present in the S&P 500 
and on analyst recommendations. Firstly, it was found that from the 32 different stocks 
approved (they are 33 but one was an ETF so it was not considered), 78% (25 stocks) were in 
the S&P 500. From the 14 stocks rejected, only 50% were in the S&P 500 what shows a 
tendency to approve or to vote more positively in stocks with more recognizable names. 
Additionally, based on analyst recommendations, 72% of the approved stocks had more than 
50% buy recommendations, 50% had more than 2/3 of buy recommendations and 13% had 
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more than 80% buy recommendations. This shows a clear preference for choosing well 
known and well-recommended stocks that can possibly be justified by regret aversion.  
The fifth bias mentioned was Mental Accounting. When looking at NSP, there are only 
3 decisions in each IC: vote on the allocation, vote on others’ stocks picks and present a stock 
pick (if the case). Then, it was analysed how students behaved on these 3 topics because the 
fact that the behaviours were not in accordance with each other or that there is not a rational 
reasoning or pattern might be a sign that they were probably considered separately, and so 
students were affected by mental accounting. One sign of mental accounting is that from the 
10 students presenting the top 10 riskier stock picks, 5 of them voted for a bearish allocation 
in that IC and the other 5 voted bullish in that IC, showing mixed behaviours. There were two 
hypotheses: or they were very bullish and it would make sense to present them if they were 
bullish on the market performance and then they would vote more bullish on the allocation as 
well, or they had the intention of diversifying and so they would vote the opposite (bearish) in 
the allocation. What one can observe is that the behaviours differ with half (50%) doing one 
thing and the other half doing another. This shows that probably the decisions were not 
considered together as there was not a pattern and a clear desire for diversification, as it 
would have happened if students considered both decisions together. On the other hand, from 
the students voting in favour of buying these stocks, there was 9 times (90%) that more than 
80% vote bearish in the allocation showing in this case less propensity to mental accounting. 
Furthermore, this bias impacted NSP’s performance negatively as from the 10 stocks 
mentioned, 7 had a negative return. (70%). Students, mainly stock pickers, did not present a 
consistent reasoning when making decisions, sometimes making decisions in accordance, but 
sometimes making the complete opposite decisions as just explained. This type of behaviour 
can be caused by mental accounting as students probably did not considered the decisions 
together, but instead as separate ones, making irrational choices as a consequence. 
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The sixth bias mentioned in section 3 is Overconfidence. The main and immediate 
consequence of this bias is excessive trading. When people are overconfident, they tend to 
trade more. To test overconfidence one can infer if students traded more when performing 
well in their first stock pick, and how was their performance after that. From the 14 students 
that had stock picks approved, 10 had a positive return on their first pick (71%). From these 
10, 8 decided to present another stock pick (80%). From the ones that presented this second 
stock pick, 5 had a negative return meaning that 63% had a negative performance in the 
second pick after having had a positive return in the first stock pick. This can be due to 
overconfidence, as the fact that they performed well in the first pick made them trade less 
rationally and cautiously in their second stock pick, what led to a negative performance. Also, 
Barber and Odean (2001) found that men are on average more confident than women and 
consequently tend to trade more. Despite the fact that there were only two women in the NSP 
fund, what happened is that the average number of stock picks for men was 3.8 while for 
women was just 2, confirming somehow what the study mentions. 
The seventh bias mentioned above is Availability. One way to test the availability bias 
is to analyse if there was a tendency to approve or vote more positively on more popular 
stocks. What one verifies is that from the 32 stocks bought, 7 are not from the S&P 500. From 
those 7, 2 were only approved at the second time they were presented and from the other 5, 4 
have an approval rate lower than 80%. If one compares this approval rate with the average 
approval rate of all stocks this bias becomes clearer. The average approval rate of the 32 
stocks is 84%, but if one takes out these 7 stocks, it increases to 86% (the average of the 4 
previously mentioned stocks is “just” 71%). The impact on the performance is mixed with 4 
of the 7 stocks that are not in the S&P 500 having negative returns. Furthermore, one can also 
take into account the stocks that were not approved and one found that 50% of the stocks 
rejected were not in the S&P 500. This behaviour can be explained by the availability bias, as 
	 19	
people tend to invest in stocks that are more familiar to them and are more available in their 
heads mainly because they recognize and know the business and not due to the company’s 
fundamentals or other rational reasons. This bias is somehow related with Regret Aversion, as 
the consequence is the same that is to invest more in hot stocks, despite their fundamentals. 
The eight bias explained before is Anchoring. Investors tend to rely too much on a 
reference value. It can be the price that a stock exhibited before starting to drop or for 
example the price at which it was bought. The main consequence of this bias is conservatism 
as people will only gradually adapt to new information and that it would take some 
observations to change their opinion. Another consequence is that investors tend to invest in 
stocks that have fallen considerably in the short term as they will be anchoring on a recent 
high of the stock and will expect it to mean revert, seeing this as an opportunity to buy the 
stock at discount. To test the presence of Anchoring, it was analysed the percentage of stocks 
approved that were dropping more than 5% in the last week and in the last month. The results 
are that from the stocks that were approved and were dropping, 36% were dropping more than 
5% in the last week and 58% were dropping more than 5% in the last month. This shows a 
preference for either stocks that are going up or instead, for stocks that dropped a lot recently.  
The ninth bias that can be found in the NSP fund is the Gamblers Fallacy. It is somehow 
related with the previous one as both lead investors to buying stocks that are dropping. The 
two main consequences of this bias are regarding market performance and regarding stock 
picking. The first is a tendency to vote on the allocation against what happened in the 
previous week as investors think the tendency will revert. The second is the tendency for 
people to buy stocks that have been dropping just because they think the “bad luck” is about 
to change. The first consequence can be easily found and confirmed has the allocation votes 
were against the market performance in 65% of the times (if it increase/decreased the 
previous week the votes would be more bearish/bullish). The second can be found by 
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studying number of stock picks presented that were dropping before. Considering periods of 1 
year and 1 month, there is evidence of a considerable percentage of Gamblers Fallacy as 36% 
of the stocks approved and 33% of stock rejected had a negative return on the previous month 
and 48% and 58% respectively had a negative return on the previous year. This bias was 
found in a moderate way, specially in what stock picking is concerned, but the findings are 
consistent with the literature as Kannadhasan (2006) found that more experienced investors 
have more tendency to commit gamblers fallacy and in this case the students are 
inexperienced investors. Furthermore, the impact in the performance is mixed as by analysing 
one can infer that, in this sample, this bias affects positively the performance when stocks 
were dropping month to date, as 58% had positive returns while it affects negatively in the 
case that the ones dropping year to date, as 44% had a positive return. 
Finally, Herding behaviour, that is the tenth and last bias that will be analysed, can be 
found either in allocation votes and stock picking votes as people might have the tendency to 
follow the others in both voting processes. By analysing the votes on the allocations, in the 18 
IC there were 78% of them with 2/3 of the votes in the same direction (either more bullish or 
bearish), 61% of them with 75% of the votes in the same direction and 44% of them with 85% 
of the votes in the same direction and, finally, there were even 5 ICs (28%) with 100% of the 
votes in the same direction. This clearly shows herding behaviour in the allocation votes by 
the NSP students. Regarding stock picks, an analogous reasoning was made. From the 47 
stock picks presented (they were 50 but 3 of them were bought twice so they were not 
considered), 70% were approved and 30% were rejected. From the ones approved, 91% were 
approved with at least 2/3 of the votes, 67% were approved with at least 80% of the votes and 
21% with 100% of the votes. On the other hand, from the ones rejected, 50% were rejected 
with at least 2/3 of the votes, 29% with at least 80% of the votes and, finally, just one (7%) 
with 100% of the votes. The main conclusion is that herding behaviour in stock picking seems 
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to be present when approving stocks but not when rejecting stocks. This is in accordance with 
some studies about student managed investment funds that state that these type of funds due 
to the social environment of the class and the fact that students are investing real money, in 
many cases for the first time, tend to exhibit this type of bias (Caldwell and Dolvin, 2012). 
According to this study, there are specific situations where herding is more likely to occur. 
Three of them were analysed: if herding decreases over time, if herding increases with stocks 
held before and if herding increases in days with many SP presented. The findings were 
firstly that the percentages of major approvals in allocation and in stock picks were similar 
but with a slight advantage for herding in the 1st half of the course. Secondly, by analysing the 
three stocks held twice, one can observe that their second approval rate was above average for 
all of them: 100%, 93% and 87%, respectively, against an average of 84%. Thirdly, the fact 
that herding increases with the number of picks presented was found, but not significantly, as 
the average approval rate in days with 4 or more stock picks was 86% against a total average 
of 84%. The results are somehow in line with the ones found by Caldwell and Dolvin (2012): 
student managers do not change their herding behaviour over the course time, trades held 
before will be easier to get approved and days with more trading are associated with a higher 
approval rates on the stocks presented. 
The main question now is if this type of behaviour has a negative impact on the 
performance. Oddly, the answer is yes in the case of the NSP. For the stocks approved with 
100% of the votes, 57% had a negative return, which is counter intuitive because if they are 
approved so unanimously, they should perform well. Similarly, from the ones approved with 
more than 2/3 of the votes (except the ones with 100% approval), 52% had a negative 
performance. For example, the worst performing stock (DAL US Equity) was approved with 
93% of the votes. This is once again in accordance with Caldwell and Dolvin (2012) study, as 
it states that herding, especially when it is more pronounced, tend to result in lower returns.  
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4.2. Recommendations to avoid these biases 
In the specific context of the NSP fund, what can be done to avoid some of these biases 
and heuristics from happening? Both the allocation votes and the stock picking votes should 
be done secretly (through paper or online) to avoid herding. Caldwell and Dolvin (2012) 
found that this measure decreases the overall approval rate. In terms of allocation votes, these 
should account for the final grade, as it happens with votes in stock picks. In terms of stock 
pick presentation, there must be a maximum time for each SP and students should be required 
to clearly specify its investment reasoning as well as some predefined fundamentals. Also, 
each stock pick should have tighter stop losses and students should be obliged to have at least 
one SP in the fist half of the course. There should be also a maximum number of SP presented 
per IC. The course may also include a class about Behavioural Finance as it would make 
students aware of this area and, more specifically, of the behavioural biases mentioned and 
how they can impact their decisions and performance.  
Finally, to avoid biases from occurring, students in the NSP should: be patient, try not 
to be overconfident, look for accurate information before making a decision, not follow the 
crowd (other students) blindly in their decision making process and always bear in mind that 
past events are independent and not correlated with the probability of happening in the future.  
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5. Measuring Investment Sentiment 
After having explained what Behavioural Finance is, how it contributes to financial 
literature and how behavioural biases affect investment decisions, one can easily understand 
that its theories are becoming well accepted. Indeed, as Baker and Wurgler (2007) state: 
“Now, the question is no longer, as it was a few decades ago, whether investor sentiment 
affects stock prices, but rather how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects.” 
This section plans to measure the market sentiment during the period of the NSP 
portfolio, from mid November until the end of May, and assess if it had any impact in our 
allocation decisions and what would have been the performance if for example students have 
always followed the market sentiment or have always gone against it. The goal is to assess the 
returns predictability based on market sentiment indicators and try to find a good investment 
strategy recurring to market sentiment, to help students on the NSP fund to decide better in 
terms of allocation. But what is then investor sentiment? Beer and Zouaoui (2013) define it as 
“a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not warranted by 
fundamentals”, meaning that it is like a subjective aggregate belief of the investors about the 
market direction. In appendix 6 one can found a figure describing investors emotions during a 
market cycle. There are several studies in financial literature that attempted to measure 
investor sentiment. This measure can be done through direct and indirect sentiment measures 
(Brown and Cliff, 2004). The first one is based on surveys, so it directly asks investors how 
they feel about the market or about economic conditions. The second one is based on financial 
or economic variables that can somehow translate the investors’ expectations on the market, 
for example: volatility, trading volume, put/call ratio and mutual funds cash positions [(Beer 
and Zouaoui, 2013) and (Feldman, 2010)]. After a deep research on sentiment indicators4, 
three were chosen. The first one is the SPX Index, the market itself, as the direction of the 
																																								 																					
4 The other sentiment indicators considered were: University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Indexes (CONSSENT Index, CONSCURR 
Index, CONSEXP Index), Bloomberg New Highs and Lows (NWHLSENY Index), Bloomberg Trade Sentiment (TRADSENI Index and 
Sentix Indexes (SNTEUSGX Index, SNTEUSH6 Index). 
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market at some moment in time is a good proxy for investors’ expectations. The second one is 
the AAIIBULL/AAIIBEAR Index that is a direct sentiment measure based on the AAII 
Survey5, used in several studies of market sentiment as Verma and Soydemir (2009) and 
Brown and Cliff (2005). Finally, the last sentiment indicator used is the VIX Index6 that is an 
indirect measure as it is based on the volatility. But how does it measure market sentiment? 
Large investors try to hedge their portfolios and to do so they usually use options. If these 
investors think the market will go down, as it is difficult to sell large amounts of stocks, the 
way they have to hedge their portfolios is to buy put options contracts at the market to offset 
some of the expected losses. On the other hand, if they are bullish, they increase their 
leverage by buying call options. This will be reflected in the market volatility, captured by the 
VIX. Hence, Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest the VIX as an alternative market sentiment 
measure because it increases when investors buy put options to insure their portfolios against 
losses, meaning that they are more bearish. This is why the VIX is sometimes referred as the 
fear index. 
By knowing what would be the best decision at each IC (already presented before), the 
objective is, first, to compare the best decision with the one predicted by the market sentiment 
indicators and second, compare our decision with the one “recommended” by the market 
sentiment indicator. As one is trying to assess the impact on the NSP, all the returns will be 
on a weekly basis calculated from Wednesday to Wednesday (day before the ICs).  In this 
way, the assessment of short term predictability in stock returns was done similarly on what 
was done in several studies, for example, Brown and Cliff (2004).   
Starting by the S&P 500 as a proxy for market sentiment, 4 rules were tested to predict 
the best decision. The first rule7 consists in increasing the equity weights to 55/45 (going 
bullish) if the market was positive in the previous week and keep the base weights at 60/40 
																																								 																					
5 AAII Survey consists in asking a random poll of investors, on a weekly basis, their expectations on the market direction for the next 6 
months (up, down or the same) and it is obtained the percentage that is bullish, bearish or neutral. 
6 VIX Index was created by the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) to track the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index options. 
7 Intuition rule 1: Always go with the market. 
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(or decrease if the case) (going bearish) if the market was negative in the previous week. The 
second rule8 consists in going bullish if the return of the previous week was between -∞ and -
1% and between 0 and +∞ and bearish if the return in the previous week was between -1% 
and 0. The third rule9 is similar to the previous one but one would go bearish between -1% 
and 1%. The fourth and final rule10 is to go bullish if the market return in the previous week 
was between -∞ and -1% and between 0 and 1% and to go bearish in the other cases. The rule 
that gave the best results to the sample period of the NSP was the fourth one. The results are 
that 84% of the time, the market sentiment was right, meaning that the signal given by the 
market returns was able to correctly predict the behaviour of the market in the following 
week. However, the decisions made in the NSP were only 45% of the times in accordance 
with market sentiment, what resulted in an underperformance in 53% of the times. Investing 
according with this rule, in this period, would generate a cumulative return of 3.18% against 
the 1.91% generated by the NSP (taking into account only allocations). Secondly, one takes 
the AAIIBULL/AAIIBEAR Index and calculates the Bull-Bear Spread11. This measure is 
widely used in literature with Brown and Cliff (2005) even saying: “our preferred sentiment 
variable is the bull-bear spread”. The rule12 here is to go bullish when the Bull-Bear Spread 
is positive and bearish when it is negative. In this case, the market sentiment was right 42% of 
the times and the NSP decisions were 55% of the times according to market sentiment. Thus, 
in this case, it would be more valuable to invest against the market sentiment, as it would 
generate a cumulative return of 3.09% (against 2.27% if investing with market sentiment), but 
both would be better than the 1.91% of the NSP. Here applies the advice of Warren Buffet to 
“Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful”. Finally, by taking 
																																								 																					
8 Intuition rule 2: Go bullish when the market was gaining or dropping considerably (more than 1%). 
9 Intuition rule 3: Go bullish when the market was gaining considerably or losing considerably (more than 1% and less more -1%, 
respectively). 
10 Intuition rule 4: Go bullish if the market was losing considerably (more than -1%) or starting to revert (gaining more than 1%)	
11 Bull-Bear Spread is calculated by subtracting the AAIIBEAR Index to the AAIIBULL Index. 
12 Intuition rule Bull-Bear Spread: Go with the sentiment; bullish if investors expectations are more bullish and vice-versa. 
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the VIX Index as the sentiment indicator, three rules13 were tested. The first was to go bearish 
if the VIX weekly variation (from one IC to another) was positive. The second was to go 
bearish if the VIX was higher than the average of the last 5 days. Finally, the last rule is a 
“range rule” that is, if the value is above 50% of the last 5 days range, one would go bearish 
and if it is below one would go bullish. The rule that gave the best results was the third one. 
By applying it, 47% of the times the market sentiment was right and the NSP decisions were 
only 45% of the time according to the market sentiment. However, the best strategy would be 
to invest according to the market sentiment and would yield a cumulative return of 2.82%. 
Additionally, if one followed a contrarian investment strategy and invest with the opposite 
signal from the one given by rule 1, one would predict the best decision correctly in 68% of 
the time. A graph for the cumulative return of the three best rules can be found in appendix 7. 
After this study, it can be concluded that, for the period studied, the best proxy for 
subsequent return is the S&P 500, if following the best rule mentioned, at least on a weekly 
basis, and consequently, is also the one that would give the highest return (2.93%). On the 
other hand, the Bull-Bear Spread proved not to be a good proxy and a good return would be 
obtain not to invest according with sentiment but against it (2.85%). This is in accordance 
with the literature as Brown and Cliff (2005) find that sentiment is positively correlated with 
market returns, but they find no evidence of profitable short-run trading strategies based on 
sentiment. The statistics mentioned regarding the sentiment indicators can be found below. 








Best rule Rule 4 Only 1 Rule 3 
% of times sentiment indicator was right 84% 42% 47% 
% of times NSP decision was according with sentiment 45% 55% 45% 
Cumulative return following market sentiment 3.18% 2.27% 2.82% 
Cumulative return against market sentiment 2.18% 3.09% 2.54% 
 
																																								 																					
13 Intuition for the VIX rules: all the three rules follow the intuition behind the VIX that is if it is increasing (either measured in terms of 
average, variation or range), investors are more bearish. 
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Although the results are confirmed by the literature, it is important to test them in a 
longer period to infer about the validity of the conclusions obtained. Hence, it was performed 
a backtest from when there was data available (March 201214) until October 2016. The 
backtest was done using the exact same rules used before for studying just the NSP investing 
period. Firstly, by using the market as a sentiment indicator, the best rule was rule 2, 
predicting the best decision in 54% of the time. Secondly, by using the Bull-Bear Spread as 
sentiment indicator, it predicts correctly the best decision in 57% of the time, being the best 
result achieved and contrasting with what happened when testing just the NSP period. Finally, 
by using the VIX, the best rule is rule 1, which predicts correctly the best decision in 52% of 
the time. A summary with the statistics of this backtest can be found in appendix 8. 
Regarding VIX, statistical tests by Connors (2002) prove that it is able to tell when 
market top or bottom is in place, meaning that the biggest drops in SPX happen when VIX is 
low, but when it comes to predicting short-term moves, the signal is weaker and a low VIX 
rather means buying put options than selling stocks and buying bonds (Chadwick, 2006).  
Overall, the results are consistent with literature as Brown and Cliff (2004) found that 
there is correlation between sentiment indicators and market returns but does not directly 
reveal the causal relation between sentiment and the market. However, very little evidence 
suggests that sentiment explains subsequent market returns and so the authors conclude that 
strategies trying to time the market in the short term based on sentiment indicators are not 
profitable. This is exactly the case here and so the conclusion is that it is very difficult for the 
NSP students and investors as a whole to use sentiment indicators in order to profitably time 
the market and decide their overweight/underweight in equities and bonds. Additionally, SPY 
US Equity and BOND US Equity have a higher correlation of 0.9 and the average differences 
in the performances of both the 60/40 and the 55/45 allocation strategies is close to 0 p.p. so it 
is difficult to predict whether to go bullish or bearish in each IC.  
																																								 																					
14 BOND US Equity Index was only created in March 2012. 
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6. Conclusion 
This Work Project presents a new approach to the Behavioural Finance field as it not 
only focuses on the theoretical part but also tries to apply Behavioural Finance findings into a 
specific portfolio (NSP) as well as present recommendations. This area is a growing paradigm 
in Finance which joins standard finance with other social sciences namely psychology to try 
to answer some of the flaws of the classical finance theories. Behavioural Finance argues that 
these flaws in financial markets are due to behavioural biases and heuristics. This paper tries 
to explain 10 of the most well known ones and finds somehow evidence of them within the 
NSP fund.  
It is very important to understand how to avoid incurring in these biases. Firstly, it is 
very important that investors understand the biases and recognize them. Investors should also 
be completely aware of their investment criteria and more important, quantify these criteria. 
Keeping a diversified portfolio is crucial, as it would decrease the risk even if they incur in 
some of the presented biases. Furthermore, investment objectives should be established in 
terms of risk and return and investors should be aware of important constraints as the liquidity 
and the time horizon.  
Regarding sentiment, although investors trade much based on it, it is very difficult to 
predict, and this paper found no evidence that the investor sentiment impacts asset prices in 
the short-term. As it was found in this paper, the influence of the biases presented can be very 
costly in terms of performance, mainly in the context of a student managed fund with 
inexperienced investors. Consequently, and to conclude, the main message of Behavioural 
Finance is that humans are irrational and they translate that in their investments so the best 
way to make the right decision is to be aware of the findings of Behavioural Finance and then 
try to choose the right combination of risk and return.  
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